Still, more than 1,000 e-voting problems were reported to nonprofit activist group VoterProtect.org during the 2004 presidential election. In Orleans Parish, La., poll workers couldn't get machines to boot up, causing the polls to open hours late. Twenty-one ES&S machines in Broward County, Fla., crashed during the same elections. Though officials claimed no votes were lost, the lack of a voter-verifiable paper trail meant there was no way to be sure. According to the EAC, as many as 1 million votes were not counted as a result of computer error.

This is why most e-voting critics—many of whom are technologists—say some sort of voter-verifiable paper trail (in which electronic systems print out a ballot "receipt" voters can review to ensure their vote was recorded correctly) is key to the debate. But many of the e-voting machines purchased with money from HAVA did not have such a mechanism. "Without it, I don't see how anyone can believe these systems are trustworthy," says David Dill, a computer science professor at Stanford University and founder of VerifiedVoting.org, a nonprofit voter advocacy group.

Dill's point is valid, but it's only part of the solution. Further investigation of e-voting software by Finnish security expert Harri Hursti, as well as by attorney Lawrence Norden, who chaired the task force on voting-system security at the Brennan Center for Justice, showed that deeper problems persist—even with systems that print paper receipts. "No question, there are bugs in these programs that have led to votes being counted incorrectly," Norden says. "And anything that can happen by accident can also happen on purpose." After an 18‑month study to determine what it would take to pull off widespread voter fraud, he says, "we found that it is possible." The Brennan Report recommends that states undertake a series of steps to prevent errors and thwart fraud, including a voter-verifiable paper trail, random audits of voter results, a detailed chain-of-custody, parallel testing (testing an active e-voting machine on election day) and banning all wireless capabilities on the machines.

But states disagree on which steps are really necessary. In Travis County, Texas, for example, Clerk Dana DeBeauvoir says the best offense is a better defense. "We conduct a step-by-step risk assessment from the time jurisdictions get their equipment through the very end," she says. The assessment "lists everything that might go wrong and helps you figure out how to prevent or deal with it." That includes a line-by-line edit of e-voting source code, parallel testing on election day, and chain-of-custody policies that require a signature every time data or hardware changes hands.

Yet Texas doesn't require any post-­election audits or a voter-verifiable paper trail—an issue that pitted DeBeauvoir and Texas Secretary of State Roger Williams against the Texas Civil Rights Project and the NAACP in a July lawsuit (the case was dismissed). DeBeauvoir says her county flawlessly executed its March primaries, while nearly 80 other precincts across Texas suffered widespread e-voting malfunctions. "Some had to rely on the vendors to help them," she admits. "It was a pretty big problem."

In Minnesota, State Secretary Mary Kiffmeyer claims that voting recount errors have dropped from 30 percent to nearly zero since the adoption of her detailed chain-of-custody procedures, which include both paper trails and independent audits. The process is one she's been developing since taking the state secretary post in 1998, guided by her prior 11-year experience as an election judge. Kiffmeyer created strict guidelines about how the machines should be stored between elections—some states allow volunteers to take systems home with them before an election—and operated on election day. The state runs a detailed training program for county election administrators, who are graded on their performance. Though Minnesota does not perform parallel testing on election day, voting precincts' results are randomly audited to make sure there were no glitches. And the findings are all posted to the state's Web site. "In the end, you have to be realistic about technology and the circumstances you're using it in," she says.

If Congressman Holt has his way, it won't be long before all states adopt a nationwide system of checks and balances. His bill, which has nearly 200 co-sponsors and is awaiting approval in the House of Representatives, mandates all the Brennan Report's recommendations. "We are a couple of years late," he admits, "But the problem has been recognized. We need a national standard on this."

EAC Chairman Paul DeGregorio, on the other hand, doesn't believe a federal law is a good idea. "One size does not fit all," he says. "Some jurisdictions have large numbers of people and budgets, others do not. And states have different ballot and procedural needs." Ross Goldstein, deputy state administrator for the Maryland Board of Elections, which conducts parallel testing but does not require paper trails or auditing, is also wary of such a bill. "In some ways, I see the benefit to standardizing processes," he says. "But I hope whatever is being contemplated takes the election community into consideration. All of this takes time and significant investment."

Next page: Fixing the Hole in E-Voting